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CASE DIGEST
by Robert N. Schlesinger*
The materials in this section are intended to provide a concise
overview of the case law which has developed in the program patentability area. Each case is summarized in a separate digest entry. Each
digest entry contains the following information:
" case name
" case citation
* subsequent history (if any)
* title of patent in issue
" summary of salient facts
" legal analysis and holding of the court (or Patent Office Board of
Appeals)
The digest entries are organized alphabetically within two subsections. The first subsection, entitled "Historical Cases," contains summaries of cases which, although concerning inventions outside the software field, are pertinent because of the legal doctrines enunciated in
the courts' opinions. The second subsection contains all cases to date in
the "program-related invention" field.1 These entries include both
those cases decided on the question of patentability and the question of
infringement.
These materials can be used alone, or in conjunction with the Case
Reference Table set forth in the next section, as an important reference
tool by anyone involved in the area of software protection.
*

B.S. 1970, University of Iowa. Mr. Schlesinger is currently a law student in

the SCALE program at Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles,
California.
1. Because of the negative attitude of the United States Patent Office toward
patents for computer programs per se, inventors have adopted a variety of forms
in which to present their applications. As such, the term "program-related invention" has been adopted as a more accurate description of the inventions presented
in the cases to date than either the term "program" or the term "software."
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HISTORICAL CASES

In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 89 U.S.P.Q. 266, 4 CLSR 607 (C.C.P.A.
1951).
("PetroleumProspectingMethods.")

Four claims were rejected because the steps which constituted the
heart of the invention were purely mental in character. These steps
involved the mental processes of "measuring," "determining," and
"comparing."
This case set forth what later were referred to as the Abrams
"rules" (see Case H5 infra) for determining the patentability of method
claims which included mental steps. These "rules" were:
1. If all the steps of a method claim are purely mental in
character, the subject matter thereof is not patentable, within the
meaning of the patent statutes.
2. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical
steps as well as so-called mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or
advance over the art resides in one or more of the so-called
mental steps, then the claim is considered unpatentable for the
same reason that it would be if all the steps were purely mental in
character.
3. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical
steps as well as so-called mental steps, yet the novelty or advance
over the art resides in one or more of the positive and physical
steps and the so-called mental step or steps are incidental parts
of the process which are essential to define, qualify or limit its
scope, then the claim is patentable and not subject to the objection contained in 1 and 2 above.
While acknowledging that these rules were in apparent accordance
with the reported decisions, the court found it unnecessary to apply
them to the facts of this case. Finally, the C.C.P.A. in Musgrave (Case
P21 infra) formally rejected these "rules" as "unsound."

H2

Burr v. Duryea, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531 (1863).
("An Improvement in the Machineryfor Making Hat-Bodies, and in
the Process of their Manufacture.")

A patent may be granted to anyone who has discovered or invented
"any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
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matter." Because a machine is a concrete thing, consisting of parts or of
certain devices and combinations of devices, a patent must be granted
where the invention comes within the category of a machine. The patent
is for the machine, not for a "mode of operation, a principle, an idea, or
for any abstraction whatsoever." This rule of law is not affected by the
fact that the statute requires the patentee to explain "the mode of
operation" of the invention which distinguishes it from all others.
The Court used this rationale to rule that there was no infringement
of a patent for "an improvement in machinery for forming hat-bodies"
by a similar patent for "an improvement in the machinery for making
hat-bodies, and in the process of their manufacture."

H3

Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913).
("Transfer Ticket with a Detachable Coupon.")

A street railroad transfer ticket with a detachable coupon was held
patentable on its novel "structure" and its being an "article to be used
in a method of doing business." It was held a "manufacture" within the
meaning of the patent statute.

H4

Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
("An Improved Method of Bolting Flour and Improvements in the
Different Parts of the Machinery Necessary in Carrying on the
Process.")

A process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of
the instrumentalities used. If the patent is not confined to the particular
instrument or machinery used to affect that object, the use of another
instrument or machine to affect the object would be an infringement,
the general process being the same.
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. It is not an act or series of acts, performed upon the same
subject matter, to be transformed and reduced to a different state or
thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as a piece of machinery.
In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed
out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new or
patentable, whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new result. The process requires that certain things
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should be done with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the
tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary consequence.
The Cochrane "test" has been held to limit patentable processes to
those which act to change specified materials to a different state or
thing. See Case Plb infra.

H5

Ex parte Egan, 129 U.S.P.Q. 23 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1960).
("GraphicalMethods for the Interpretationof Dipmeter Logs.")

The claimed process was for measuring the depth of well bores. It
involved certain procedures such as (1) plotting one set of values on the
first chart; (2) scaling off and reading from the chart a second set of
values in a particular way on a second chart; and, (3) using this second
chart to obtain the desired set of end-values. This process, which is
analogous to a method of operating a computer, could be practiced by
an unskilled operator who did not understand the mathematical processes involved in solving difficult problems in solid geometry.
The claim was ruled patentable because a process of utilizing apparatus in a particular way to get the useful result of doing tedious,
time-consuming work by relatively unskilled labor is a statutory process. The applicant's precalculated charts, which could be looked upon
as analogous to a calculating machine, were ruled a "manufacture"
under the patent statutes because they were specified as a necessary
and essential part of the method.
The court accepted the Abrams rules (see Case H1 supra) as established law.

H6

Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817, 64
U.S.P.Q. 278 (9th Cir. 1944).
("An Acoustical Method of Determining the Unknown Location of
an Obstruction in a Well.")

The court ruled that a method patent for determining the unknown
location of an obstruction in a well was invalid for want of invention,
finding that its novelty lie only in the performance of certain mental
steps. The steps involved were described in the claims by such descriptive words as "determining," "registering," "counting," "observing,"
"measuring," "comparing," "recording," and "computing."
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In ruling this patent invalid, the court reasoned that, in substance,
the claimed method consisted of setting down three known values in a
simple equation and then computing the unknown value.

H7

O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
("An Improved Magnetic Telegraph.")

A claim for the "use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic
current, which I [Morse] call electro-magnetism, however developed,
for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any
distances, being a new application of that power" was held not patentable because the claim was "too broad and covers too much ground."
The court reasoned that one cannot get a patent monopoly on an effect
or a law of nature, viz., electric current.

H8

Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68 (1895).
("A Method of Manufacture of Belt Pulleys; a Belt Pulley with
Improved Balance; and a Belt Pulley that is Cheap, Light, and
Durable.")

A valid patent cannot be obtained for a process which involves
nothing more than the operation of a piece of equipment; that is, for the
function of a machine. A valid patent cannot be issued only for superior
workmanship.
H9

The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
("An Improvement in Electric Telephony. ")

An apparatus claim for the electrical transmission of speech was
patentable because there exists an equivalence of the changes in substances (the Cochrane test) (Case H4 supra)and electromagnetic alterations ("electrical undulations") for subject matter purposes.

H10

In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 89 U.S.P.Q. 324 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
("New and Useful Improvements in Low DragAirfoil. ")
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The claim to an airfoil, drawn as an article of manufacture, does
not define patentable subject matter where the sole novelty of the claim
resides in the method of mathematical computation by which the profile of the airfoil is determined. Purely mental steps do not form a
patentable process.
II.

PROGRAM-RELATED INVENTION CASES

Pla In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2 CLSR 1030
(C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
("Conversionof Numerical Information.")
This was the first case in which the claims were directed solely "to
the art of data-processing itself," and specific computer hardware was
disclosed. The examiner and the board rejected the method for programming a general purpose digital computer to convert binary-codeddecimal numerals (BCD) into pure binary numbers as directed to nonstatutory subject matter.
The court held that Claim 8 was not subject to the "mental steps"
doctrine, since such words as "reentrant shift register," "shifting" and
"signals" in the claim limited it to a machine-implemented process. As
for Claim 13, the court held that since the disclosed process had no
practical use other than to enhance the internal operation of a digital
computer, and since digital computers were in the "useful arts," then
the process itself was in the useful arts and patentable. See Case Plb
infra for the Supreme Court decision.

Pib

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256
(1972), rev'g sub nom. In re Benson 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548,
2 CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
("Conversion of Numerical Information.")

On writ from the C.C.P.A. (see Case Pla supra), the Supreme Court
held that the method claimed was not a "process" within the meaning
of the Patent Act, since the method was not limited to any particular act
or technology, to any particular machinery, or to any particular end
use. Such a method was held unpatentable because (1) the method was
so abstract as to cover both known and unknown uses of the binarycoded-decimal (BCD) to pure binary conversion; (2) the end use could
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vary; (3) the end use could be performed through any existing machinery or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus; (4) the
mathematical formula involved had no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer; and (5) the result of
granting a patent would be to wholly preempt the mathematical formula involved and, in practical effect, patent the algorithm itself.
The Court also held that the transformation or reduction of an
article to a different state or thing was the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that did not disclose a particular machine, resurrecting
the reasoning of Cochrane. Case H4 supra.
P2

In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 2 CLSR 359
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
("PlanarIllustration Method and Apparatus.")

The application disclosed a method of and apparatus for automatically making a two-dimensional portrayal of a three-dimensional object from any desired angle and distance and on any desired plane of
projection. The disclosure provided equations defining the geometric
relationship between the three-dimensional and two-dimensional
coordinates. The application then taught that the equations could be
used to control the operation of a computer, with the output controlling
the operation of a plotting machine.
The court found no basis for rejection on "mental steps" grounds,
since the claims "recite, and can be infringed only by, a digital computer in a certain physical condition, i.e., electromechanically set or
programmed to carry out the recited routine." The court rejected the
applicability of the "printed matter" cases since "the invention . . .
requires that the information be processed not by the mind but by a
machine, the computer, and that the drawings be done not by a
draftsman but by a plotting machine."
The fact that the point of novelty of the invention lay in the equations was held insufficient to reject the application, since "[t]o allow the
claims in issue here would not prohibit all uses of those equations," but
only where the equations were used "in the physical equipment recited
in the claim."
The court also held that "if a machine is programmed in a certain
new and unobvious way, it is physically different from the machine
without that program; its memory elements are differently arranged.
The fact that these physical changes are invisible to the eye should not
tempt us to conclude that the machine has not been changed."
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The examiner had also rejected the claims as being drawn to an
"old combination" (a computer and plotting device). The C.C.P.A. reasoned that if a prior invention does not show or support the improved
element itself, it defies logic to say that the same prior invention suggests the use of that improved element in combination with other
elements.
P3

In re Brandstadter, 484 F.2d 1395, 179 U.S.P.Q. 286, 4 CLSR 976
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
("Message Retrieving Organization.")

The information submitted consisted largely of a systems diagram
of apparatus for retrieving messages processed by a store-and-forward
communications system. The application omitted any indication of the
amount of time and effort which one of ordinary skill would have to
expend to develop the program necessary to practice the invention, and
lacked even flowcharts of the programs developed to practice the invention. The specification was held insufficient to permit one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention without undue experimentation and delay. A statement that the recited functions were "well
known data processing functions" was held insufficient.
One skilled in an art has an expertise above that of the unskilled
person, but if the selection of suitable apparatus to carry out the invention would require undue experimentation and delay, the disclosure is
inadequate legal consideration for the granting of a patent.
P4

In re Brown, 477 F.2d 946, 177 U.S.P.Q. 691, 4 CLSR 56 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
(" TerrestrialNavigation System. ")

The claims to an invention relating to a terrestrial navigation system capable of all-weather operation were rejected for inadequate
disclosure. The most tangible disclosure in the application was of a
"mathematical model" of the system. While a program was said to have
been prepared for the mathematical model, no program was disclosed.
The court held that although a successful mathematical model may
have value in developing a practical system, a discussion of such a
model was not necessarily adequate to disclose how to make the actual
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invention, particularly where there was so little description of the
operative relationships of the elements.
Where an invention involves two technologies, the knowledge of a
person skilled in both technologies is the criterion for sufficiency of
disclosure. Several lengthy meetings with a person who later submitted
an affidavit in support of the application denigrated the value of the
affidavit on the issue of adequate disclosure.
P5

Bullard Co. v. General Electric Co., 348 F.2d 985,146 U.S.P.Q. 141,
4 CLSR 1016 (4th Cir. 1965).
("Devices for Control of an Automatic Machine Tool. ")

The claims measure the invention. The claims, however, must be
construed in light of the specification, which is protective only to the
point that it gives such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains to make and use the
invention.
Combination claims for devices for the regulation of machine tool
operations were ruled not infringed, since a combination patent covers
only the totality of elements in the claims, and no element, separately
viewed, is within the patent grant. Using this line of reasoning, the
court held that a punched tape was not "equivalent" to an arrangement
of mechanical cams performing the same function.

P6

In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 6 CLSR 52
(C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR
466 (1977).
("Method of Operating a Multiprogrammed Computing System. ")

Claims to an invention which evaluated and reassigned program
priorities as programs excecuted in a multiprogram computing system,
although drawn to a method of operating a computing system, simply
defined a novel method for operating that particular machine system in
a particular mode and were not drawn to a mathematical problemsolving algorithm or to purely mental steps. The claims therefore defined patentable subject matter.
While the method adjusted priorities of computer processing programs, no program per se was claimed. The court narrowly construed
the Supreme Court holding in Gottschalk v. Benson (Case Plb supra)to
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apply only to claims which "would have preempted all practical uses of
both the underlying mathematical formula and the involved algorithm." It refused to construe Gottschalk v. Benson as holding all
computer programs unpatentable.
P7

In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35, 4 CLSR 66
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
("Method of Determining Subsurface Porosity.")

A method claim, in which the point of novelty was a mathematical
equation to be solved as the final step of the method, was held nonstatutory. The addition of the "steps" of establishing values for the
variables in the equation cannot convert an unpatentable method to
patentable subject matter.
P8

In

re Comstock, 481 F.2d 905, 178 U.S.P.Q. 616, 4 CLSR 818

(C.C.P.A. 1973).
("Electronic Calculator.")
The application related to an electronic calculator having as its
principle feature a means for retrieving numerical data placed in storage on a first-in, first-out (FIFO) basis. The court ruled that the specification sufficiently disclosed the structure supporting those elements of
the combination of means appearing in the claims. A general reference
to the structure of an IBM 1620 computer was held sufficient disclosure
of apparatus. The specification described the invention and enabled one
skilled in the art to make and use the invention.
A specific computer was disclosed. The court held that the disclosed computer was "altered by the operation of the disclosed program."

P9

In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 195 U.S.P.Q. 439,
(C.C.P.A. 1977).

-

CLSR -

("Method of Generating a Curve, Applicable to Tracing Machines
or Machine Tools. ")
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Process claims were denied for a method of generating curves,
employing a computer in conjunction with drafting and milling machines. The claims recited a process for solving a set of mathematical
equations, the solution being a set of points along a curve, rather than a
process which merely used equation solutions as one step in achieving
some result other than the solution of the equations. The claims were
rejected as drawn to nonstatutory subject matter, since a patent
containing the claims would in effect be no more than a patent on the
equations themselves.
Gottschalk v. Benson (Case Plb supra)was narrowly construed by
the court and found not to hold all computer programs unpatentable.
Pio In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689, 193 U.S.P.Q. 645, 6 CLSR 408
(C.C.P.A. 1977).

("Multi-Unit Optimization.")
Methods of operating a system of manufacturing plants, when considered as a whole, did not preempt a mathematical formula, an involved algorithm or a program per se. The methods were therefore
ruled to be statutory processes.

P11

Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n, 187 U.S.P.Q. 602
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977).
("Data ProcessingSystem Parimutuel Wagering Equipment.")

A patent relating to a solid state electronic system for processing
data from ticket issuing machines was held invalid for obviousness. The
court reasoned that the claims did not perform functions that differed
from the prior art in the totalisator business. Instead, solid state electronic means were merely applied to do the totalisator function with
improved performance. The court found that this improved performance was just what could have been predicted when those means were
applied to perform that function.
"The scope of the prior act in this case, in which the hypothetical
reasonable person must be ordinarily skilled" is the data processing
industry generally.
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In re Doyle, 482 F.2d 1385, 179 U.S.P.Q. 227 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
("Method and Apparatusfor PatternData Processing.")

The application was to a system that "automatically produces data
for [clothing] patterns of all the desired sizes from a single reference
pattern." Schematic block diagrams were disclosed, including several
computers, but no programswere set out.
Rejections by the examiner and Board of Appeal were based on
inadequate disclosure of the "position data converter" and "computers." The affidavits submitted were held "unconvincing of the level
of skill in the art to deal with the problem of modifying a computer to
achieve the results" specified by the applicant. The C.C.P.A. affirmed
the Board's rejections.
P13aIn re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 195 U.S.P.Q. 9, 6 CLSR 426 (C.C.P.A.

1977).
("Method for Updating Alarm Limits.")
In claims for a method for updating alarm limits, the intermediate
step of the process used an algorithm to calculate the new values for the
alarm. The final step involved adjusting the actual alarm value. While
the examiner conceded that the method was clearly useful and within
the technological arts, he held that it was non-statutory subject matter,
since the only part of the invention which was not conventional was the
algorithm used to adjust the alarm value.
The court held that the claims involved patentable subject matter
since they were not limited to the mere act of solving an algorithm, but
involved some post-solution activity (i.e. use of the algorithm to obtain
a given result), and because the claims did not preempt the algorithm
used. The court viewed the Christensen holding (see Case P7 supra) as
limited to situations where there were no steps other than those steps
required for solution of the algorithm.

P14

In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 169 U.S.P.Q. 99, 2 CLSR 994 (C.C.P.A.
1971).
("Processingof Geophysical Data.")

CASE DIGEST

1978]

Those method claims for processing seismograms to compensate for
the effect of distortion and to emphasize the characteristics of geological formations were rejected as not distinctly claiming that which claimants regarded as their invention. This was because the "signals" alone
could be read on visible patterns, which might be subjected to manual
manipulation (human implementation), rather than limited to machine
implementation.
Other method claims were held patentable over the contention that
their "means-plus-function" language encompassed a human being as
the means or a part of the means. The claims, limited to "electrical
signals," were found to read only on machine implementations of the
process, since the signals in those claims were limited to a form recognized in the art as limited to machine implementation.
The apparatus claims were held patentable since they were in the
statutorily authorized "means-plus-function" form.

P15

In re Freeman, 5 CLSR 518 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1974).
("A Computer-Generated Typsetting System. ")

The examiner claimed that the novelty resided in the algorithm and
attendant software, and was analogous to the invention found unpatentable in Christensen. (Case P7 supra.) The Board held Christensen
inapposite since "the instant case involves more than the mere practice
of an algorithm or formula on data considered to be old and well
known."
However, the Board entered a new rejection, based upon the reasoning of Gottschalk v. Benson. (Case Plb supra.) The Board reasoned
that the novelty of the invention resided in the computer program and a
patent on the invention "in practical effect would be a patent on the
algorithm itself." The fact that appellant used apparatus language
rather than method language (as used in Benson) was held "to be of no
moment."
P16

In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 169 U.S.P.Q. 723, 3 CLSR 70 (C.C.P.A.
1971).
("ProgrammedData Processingwith Facilitated Transfers.")
Method claims were rejected for insufficent disclosure. The only
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description of apparatus was in the form of "block diagrams" indicating the various elements of the system. The specification did not identify the elements, their interrelationship, nor a particular apparatus
intended to carry out each function.
To rebut this rejection, appellants referred to a textbook, which
they claimed showed computer components and circuits, and to certain
classes in the Patent Office classification system (apparently relating to
computer circuits). They asserted that these references made it clear
that the selection and assembly of the components required to perform
the claim method were "well within the skill of persons of ordinary skill
in the art."
The court found this "evidence" to be "meager" and the argument
to be conclusionary. It reasoned that this "showing is not persuasive
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to provide
apparatus for practicing the present invention from appellant's drawing taken in connection with their specification." In addition, the court
held that this "evidence" did not demonstrate that such a person would
be taught how to modify previously known "overlap mode" computers
to practice the invention.
The court specifically held that even where a claim was to a
"method," adequate disclosure of the particular apparatus required to
practice the method was still necessary.
P17

In re Gunn, 537 F.2d 1123, 190 U.S.P.Q. 402, 6 CLSR 248 (C.C.P.A.
1976).
("PostalApparatus and Method.")

Evidence relating to the apparatus and method for computing the
amount of postage and for printing such amount and the zip code of the
addressee on mail was held insufficient to overcome a prima facie case
of nonenablement. The Patent Office concluded that the disclosure was
inadequate in view of the applicant's use of block diagrams and the lack
of specific information with regard to structure of the computer, coin
receiver, label issuer, label applier, amount display and geographical
display.
The fact that the Patent Office accepts applications without a
drawing does not warrant the conclusion that an application need not
disclose apparatus to perform the method, where the apparatus was not
conventional.

CASE DIGEST
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P18aIn re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 4 CLSR 1491
(C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189
U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133 (1976).
("Machine System for Automatic Record-keeping of Bank Checks
and Deposits.")
Apparatus claims in a patent application for an automatic financial
record-keeping system that utilizes a digital computer were found to be
patentable. The court ruled that the apparatus claims (1) were in
compliance with the statutory requirements that the subject matter
which an applicant regards as his invention be particularly pointed out,
(2) were of statutory subject matter ("record-keeping machine system")
and were within the "technological arts," and, (3) were not indefinite on
the theory that they purportedly encompassed a human being as part of
the claimed invention. See Case P18b infra for the Supreme Court
decision.
P18b Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133

(1976), rev'g sub nom. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 183 U.S.P.Q.
172, 4 CLSR 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
("Machine System for Automatic Record-keeping of Bank Checks
and Deposits.")
A patent was sought for a computer system for automatic record
keeping of bank checks and deposits. By using machine readable checks
and deposit slips bearing numerical category codes for various types of
expenditures and sources of deposited funds, the system permitted a
bank to furnish a customer with subtotals for each category of transactions conducted through the customer's single bank account.
The Court ruled that the computer system was not patentable on
the ground of obviousness. A patent may not be obtained if the subject
matter would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the applicable art. The relevant prior art
was held to be that of computer technology rather than the art of the
banking industry.

P19 Ex parte King & Barton, 146 U.S.P.Q. 590, 1 CLSR 302 (Pat. Off.

Bd. App. 1964).
("Digital Computer.")
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The claims in the application related to a special purpose computer
arranged to mathematically process stored data. The processing was
performed in accordance with a system of mathematical expressions
free of parenthetical groupings, already known to mathematicians as
"Polish Notation."
The court ruled that the claims were not directed to the novel
configuration of a computer which can process data expressed in Polish
Notation, but that the claims merely set forth the result of the function
accomplished by any computer operating on data in Polish Notation.
P20

In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357, 178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 4 CLSR 799
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
("A System for Computer Processing of List Information.")

The application was for a system for computer processing of list
information. The application contained a block diagram and a description thereof, with "disclosure of the preferred embodiment of the invention . . . made up of a number of computer programs listings." Additionally, the disclosure went into "considerable detail" concerning the
interrelationship between the hardware elements. The specification
also identified an "IBM 7094 Data Processing System" as one type of
apparatus which could process the listed programs.
The Patent Office contended that to properly disclose the invention, the application would "not only have to include a detailed description of the circuits" of the computer, but would "also have to include a
detailed description of the physical state such circuit would be placed
in by the disclosed program." The Board affirmed. The C.C.P.A. overruled the Patent Office and Board on the disclosure rejections, but
upheld the Board's prior art rejections.
P21

In

re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742, 164 U.S.P.Q. 572, 2 CLSR 587

(C.C.P.A. 1970).
("Synchronizing Circuit.")
Method claims, which read on both statutory and nonstatutory
subject matter, can still comply with the statutory requirement that the
applicant distinctly claim what he regards as his invention. The term
"bit" when used in conjunction with "bit stream" has a meaning in the
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art which precludes reading the claims on a mentally performable
process. Thus, machine implementation can be found in the term "bit."
P22

In re McIlroy, 442 F.2d 1397, 170 U.S.P.Q. 31, 3 CLSR 81 (C.C.P.A.
1971).
("Machine Processing of Symbolic Data Constituents.")

Whether a method claim is machine-implemented or mentallyimplemented is not determinative in deciding whether the claim is
statutory.

P23

In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 167 U.S.P.Q. 280, 2 CLSR 920
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
("Corrections for Seismic Data Obtained from ExpandingSpread.")

The examiner and Board applied the Abrams "rules" (Case H1
supra), and rejected the claims as "mental steps." The C.C.P.A. took
this opportunity to reinstate the analysis of Abrams done by Judge
Smith in PraterI(Case P26a infra), and held that the "rules" of Abrams
"have never enjoyed the approval of this court," that and "Rules 2 and
3, at least, are logically unsound." In light of the Prater decisions, the
claims were found patentable.
The court also held that in considering the patentability of a process consisting of a plurality of steps, the question as to whether individual steps are old is immaterial to the question of whether the combination of those steps is a patentable process.
P24

In re Naquin, 398 F.2d 863,158 U.S.P.Q. 317, 4 CLSR 441 (C.C.P.A.
1968).
("Analysis of Seismic Signals.")

Opinions in affidavits filed by the applicant are not evidence. An
affidavit, stating that an average programmer could program a computer to make the mathematical computations for the claimed method,
would not overcome a rejection of the claims, since the specification did
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not set forth the method in such terms as to enable a person skilled in
the art to use it.
P25

In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 191 U.S.P.Q. 721, 6 CLSR 69 (C.C.P.A.
1976), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 465 (1977).
("RasterScan Computer Graphics System. ")

The claims were drawn to an apparatus for scan-converting a first
sequence of data signals into a second sequence of signals. The examiner and Board rejected the application, claiming that the applicant
perceived his invention "to lie in the computer program disclosed." The
C.C.P.A. held that no matter how an applicant perceives his invention,
it is the claims which define the invention. The claims, were distinguished from those in Gottschalk v. Benson (Case Plb supra), since
they were limited to a particular technology (computer graphics systems and scan-conversion of graphic information), and were directed to
statutory subject matter since they were drawn to a physical structure
and not to laws of nature or a mathematical algorithm.
The court further held that the claims which encompassed "meansplus-function" recitations were not subject to rejection for failure to
disclose the detailed internal structure of the computer as programmed.
Nor need the specification disclose the full range of equivalents of the
invention, some of which may be non-existent at the time the patent
application is filed.

P26a(Prater I) In re Prater & Wei, 415 F.2d 1378, 159 U.S.P.Q. 583, 2
CLSR 8 (C.C.P.A. 1968), supersededby, 415 F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q.
541, 2 CLSR 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
("Reduction of Data from Spectral Analysis. ")
The application was for a method and apparatus for processing
conventionally-obtained data to produce a quantitative spectrographic
analysis of a qualitatively-known mixture and to determine unknown
component concentrations with minimum error. The examiner rejected
the method claims as unpatentable mental processes. He rejected the
apparatus claims on two grounds. First, he held that the invention
"would be an obvious modification of a known general purpose digital
computer to program it accordingly." Second, he held that since the
apparatus claims read on unpatentable general purpose computers,
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they failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the appellant's
invention. The board affirmed the decision of the examiner.
Judge Smith, speaking for the court, first distinguished the Abrams
case (Case HI supra) on the grounds that the steps in Abrams could
only be performed mentally, while Prater's invention was to be performed "without requiring any steps to be performed in the human
mind." The Abrams "rules" were also rejected.
Judge Smith then considered the decision in Cochrane v. Deener
(Case H4 supra), rejecting the view expressed in previous cases that
Cochrane stood for the proposition that a process claim, to be patentable, must act on physical substances. Analyzing the history of the
mental process doctrine, he concluded that there was nothing in the
patent laws to deny patent protection to process claims that could
alternatively be read on "pencil and paper" practice. He held that the
process claims were patentable.
The apparatus claims were also found patentable.

P26b

(PraterII) In re Prater & Wei, 415 F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541, 2
CLSR 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969), superseding, 415 F.2d 1378, 159 U.S.P.Q.
583, 2 CLSR 8 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
("Reduction of Data From Spectral Analysis. ")

On rehearing, the C.C.P.A. held that the case was not "controlled
by" Abrams (Case H1 supra), Cochrane (Case H4 supra) and Yuan
(Case H10 supra). It further found it unnecessary to discuss the "mental
steps" doctrine since the application disclosed apparatus for performing the process wholly without human intervention. However, the court
did find the process claims overly broad, since they contained no express limitations which would preclude the invention from reading on
''a mental process augmented by pencil and paper markings."
The apparatus claims were again held patentable. The "meansplus-function" language was held not to encompass the human being as
a "means."
P27

In

re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 195 U.S.P.Q. 340, (C.C.P.A. 1977).

CLSR

-

("Radar Boresight Calibration and Velocity Vector Determination. ")
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A method of calculating an airborne radar boresight correction
angle aboard the aircraft, which utilized an arithmetical formula and
included new and unobvious steps for acquiring the data used in the
formula, was found not statutory subject matter.
The court held that if a claim was directed essentially to an arithmetic formula, substituting "words which mean the same thing" as the
formula in the claim would not render the method patentable. This
would be true even if the formula (or substituted words) were limited to
a "specific purpose."

P28

In re Scarbrough, 500 F.2d 560, 182 U.S.P.Q. 298, (C.C.P.A. 1974).
("Computer-ControlledVocal Response.")

The application related to devices which provided vocal responses,
under control of a computer, from a vocabulary of spoken words stored
in analog form. Each device in the application was identified only by its
generic name and the overall function it performed. The applicant
claimed that with this identification, a person of ordinary skill would
be able to make and use the apparatus with only a reasonable amount of
experimentation. The court held this disclosure insufficient because an
unreasonable amount of work would be required to achieve the detailed
relationships the applicant claimed to have solved.

P29

In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 158 U.S.P.Q. 141 (C.C.P.A.
1968).
("Pulse Sorting Apparatusand Method.")

A process claim, otherwise patentable, is no longer to be rejected
merely because the application of which it is a part discloses apparatus
which would inherently carry out the recited steps.

P30a

(Waldbaum I) In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 173 U.S.P.Q. 430, 3
CLSR 173 (C.C.P.A. 1972), superseded by, 559 F.2d 611, 194
U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
("Method of OperatingData Processor.")
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This application related to a method for controlling the operation
of a data processor to determine the number of l's in a data word.
The specification stated that there were numerous needs for such a
method in computer-controlled systems. A traffic study on telephone
lines was given as an example. The court ruled that the process was
useful in the internal operation of the computer system and hence a
statutory process within the "useful arts," citing In re Benson (Case Pla
supra) and Musgrave (Case P22 supra).

P3b(WaldbaumHI) In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611, 194 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6
CLSR 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977), superseding, 457 F.2d 997, 173
U.S.P.Q. 430, 3 CLSR 173 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
("Method of OperatingData Processor.")
Between the first and second hearing on Waldbaum's application,
the Supreme Court decided Gottschalkv. Benson (Case Plb supra). The
court, in this second opinion, held that the claims directed to a method
for controlling the operation of a data processor and those directed to
the new use of a stored program data processing apparatus were so
abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the
claimed method, and thus "proscribed by Benson." A patent on such
claims would, in effect, be a patent on the algorithm itself and would
not define a statutory process.
In addition, the court held that the claims directed to methods
specifically applied to counting busy and idle lines in a telephone
system would, in effect, be a patent on the algorithm itself, citing
Christensen (Case P7 supra).
P31

In

re Warmus, 561 F.2d 816, 195 U.S.P.Q. 234, 6 CLSR 430

(C.C.P.A. 1977).
("Computer PreparedContract Plan.")
An application for a patent relating to a method for computerassisted preparation of motor vehicle sales documents was rejected for
obviousness.
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In re Wheeling, 413 F.2d 1187, 162 U.S.P.Q. 588, 2 CLSR 297
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
("Optimizationwith Random and Historical Vectors. ")

Method claims were rejected by the Patent Office as having no
novelty other than mental steps. The claims related to the production of
an optimum value of a system output function, where the effect of
changes in variables upon the function could be determined.
On appeal the C.C.P.A. remanded the case for further hearings. The
reasoning was that in rejecting claims, the Patent Office failed to state
the statutory basis for the rejection. The court further held that the
Patent Office must also identify the issues with sufficient clarity that
the C.C.P.A. can review them on appeal.

